Analysis of the Proposed Consent Order and the Draft Complaint to Aid Public Comment I. Introduction The Federal Trade Commission ("Commission") has accepted for public comment from The Kroger Co. ("Kroger") and Fred Meyer Stores, Inc. ("Fred Meyer") (collectively "the Proposed Respondents") an Agreement Containing Consent Order ("the proposed consent order"). The Proposed Respondents have also reviewed a draft complaint contemplated by the Commission. The proposed consent order is designed to remedy likely anticompetitive effects arising from the merger of Jobsite Holdings, Inc. ("Jobsite"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Kroger, with and into Fred Meyer (the "Merger"), through which Fred Meyer will become a wholly-owned subsidiary of Kroger. II. Description of the Parties and the Proposed Acquisition Kroger, an Ohio corporation headquartered in Cincinnati, Ohio, operates over 1,400 supermarkets in 23 states. Kroger's supermarkets operate under the "Kroger," "Fry's," "Dillons,""King Soopers," "City Markets," and "Gerbes" trade names. In the states where Kroger competes with Fred Meyer, Kroger operates supermarkets in Arizona under the "Fry's" trade name and in Utah and Wyoming under the "City Market" and "King Sooper" trade names. Kroger has plans to open a supermarket in Cheyenne, Wyoming, under the "King Sooper" trade name. Kroger had $26.57 billion in United States revenues for the fiscal year that ended on December 27, 1997. Following the merger, Kroger will remain the largest supermarket firm in the United States. Fred Meyer, a Delaware corporation headquartered in Portland, Oregon, operates approximately 800 supermarkets in 12 western states. Fred Meyer's supermarkets operate under the "Smith's Food & Drug Centers" trade name in Arizona, Utah, and Wyoming, as well as the "Fred Meyer" trade name in Arizona and Utah, and the "Price Rite" trade name in Arizona. Fred Meyer had $14.88 billion in total sales for the fiscal year that ended on January 31, 1999. Pursuant to the Merger proposed by Kroger and Fred Meyer, Jobsite will merge with and into Fred Meyer and Fred Meyer will become a wholly-owned subsidiary of Kroger. As a result of the Merger, Fred Meyer's outstanding shares of common stock will be extinguished and the holder of each such share will be entitled to receive one newly-issued share of common stock of Kroger in exchange for each extinguished share of Fred Meyer common stock. The total equity value of the proposed merger is approximately $15 billion. III. The Draft Complaint The draft complaint alleges that the relevant line of commerce (i.e., the product market) is the retail sale of food and grocery items in supermarkets. Supermarkets provide a distinct set of products and services for consumers who desire to one-stop shop for food and grocery products. Supermarkets carry a full line and wide selection of both food and nonfood products (typically more than 10,000 different stock-keeping units ("SKUs")), as well as a deep inventory of those SKUs. In order to accommodate the large number of food and nonfood products necessary for one-stop shopping, supermarkets are large stores that typically have at least 10,000 square feet of selling space. Supermarkets compete primarily with other supermarkets that provide one-stop shopping for food and grocery products. Supermarkets primarily base their food and grocery prices on the prices of food and grocery products sold at other nearby supermarkets. Supermarkets do not regularly price-check food and grocery products sold at other types of stores, and do not significantly change their food and grocery prices in response to prices at other types of stores. Most consumers shopping for food and grocery products at supermarkets are not likely to shop elsewhere in response to a small price increase by supermarkets. Retail stores other than supermarkets that sell food and grocery products, such as neighborhood "mom & pop" grocery stores, convenience stores, specialty food stores (e.g., seafood markets, bakeries, etc.), club stores, military commissaries, and mass merchants, do not effectively constrain prices at supermarkets. These other stores operate significantly different retail formats. None of these stores offers a supermarket's distinct set of products and services that enable consumers to one-stop shop for food and grocery products. According to the draft complaint, the relevant sections of the country (i.e., the geographic markets) in which to analyze the acquisition are the areas in and near the following cities and towns: (a) Prescott, Arizona; (b) Sierra Vista, Arizona; (c) Yuma, Arizona; (d) Cheyenne, Wyoming; (e) Green River, Wyoming; (f) Rock Springs, Wyoming; and (g) Price, Utah. Kroger and Fred Meyer are actual and direct competitors in and near Prescott, Sierra Vista, Yuma, Green River, Rock Springs, and Price. Kroger is an actual potential competitor against Fred Meyer in and near the Cheyenne relevant market. But for the acquisition, Kroger and Fred Meyer would become direct competitors in the Cheyenne relevant market. The acquisition will eliminate that competition. According to the draft complaint, the Prescott, Sierra Vista, Yuma, Arizona; Green River, Rock Springs, Wyoming; and Price, Utah, relevant markets are highly concentrated, whether measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (commonly referred to as "HHI")(1) or by two-firm and four-firm concentration ratios. The acquisition would substantially increase concentration in each market. Kroger and Fred Meyer would have a combined market share of near or greater than 35% in each geographic market. The post-acquisition HHIs in the geographic markets range from 2,793 to 10,000. The draft complaint further alleges that the Cheyenne, Wyoming, relevant market is also highly concentrated. The market will remain highly concentrated as a result of this acquisition, and will be significantly more concentrated than it would have been but for the acquisition. According to the draft complaint, entry is difficult and would not be timely, likely, or sufficient to prevent anticompetitive effects in the relevant geographic markets. According to the draft complaint, the Agreement and Plan of Merger between Kroger and Fred Meyer, pursuant to which Jobsite will merge with and into Fred Meyer and Fred Meyer will become a wholly-owned subsidiary of Kroger, may substantially lessen competition in the relevant markets in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18, and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45, by eliminating direct competition between supermarkets owned or controlled by Kroger and supermarkets owned or controlled by Fred Meyer; by eliminating actual potential competition between supermarkets owned or controlled by Kroger and supermarkets owned or controlled by Fred Meyer; by increasing the likelihood that Kroger will unilaterally exercise market power; and by increasing the likelihood of, or facilitating, collusion or coordinated interaction among the remaining supermarket firms. Each of these effects increases the likelihood that the prices of food, groceries, or services will increase, and the quality and selection of food, groceries, or services will decrease, in the relevant sections of the country. IV. Terms of the Proposed Consent Order The proposed consent order will remedy the Commission's competitive concerns about the proposed acquisition. Under the terms of the proposed consent order, the Proposed Respondents must divest eight specific supermarkets in the relevant markets. Five of the supermarkets that the Proposed Respondents must divest are currently owned and operated by Kroger (of which two operate under the "Fry's" banner and three operate under the "City Market" banner), and three of the supermarkets are currently owned and operated by Fred Meyer (all of which operate under the "Smith's" banner). The Proposed Respondents must divest: (1) two Fred Meyer "Smith's" in Cheyenne, Wyoming, to Nash-Finch Company ("Nash-Finch"), one of the largest food wholesalers in the United States and an operator of many company-owned supermarkets; (2) one Kroger "City Market" in Price, Utah, to Albertson's, Inc., one of the largest retail food and drug chains operating in the United States; and (3) two Kroger "Fry's," two Kroger "City Markets," and one Fred Meyer "Smith's" in various locations to Fleming Companies, Inc. ("Fleming"), the second- largest supermarket wholesaler in the United States and an operator of many company-owned supermarkets. These divestitures include every Kroger supermarket or every Fred Meyer supermarket in each relevant market. Each upfront buyer owns no supermarkets in the same market where it is acquiring one or more divested supermarkets from the Proposed Respondents. The specific supermarkets that the Proposed Respondents must divest to Nash-Finch, Albertson's, and Fleming are listed below. The two supermarkets that the Proposed Respondents must divest to Nash-Finch in accordance with the agreement between Kroger and Nash-Finch dated March 31, 1999, are:
The one supermarket that the Proposed Respondents must divest to Albertson's in accordance with the agreement between Kroger and Albertson's dated March 31, 1999, is:
The five supermarkets that the Proposed Respondents must divest to Fleming in accordance with the agreements between Kroger and Fleming dated March 31, 1999, and April 7, 1999, are:
From the time Jobsite merges with and into Fred Meyer until the divestitures have been completed, the Proposed Respondents are required to maintain the viability, competitiveness, and marketability of the assets to be divested, must not cause their wasting or deterioration, and cannot sell, transfer, or otherwise impair their marketability or viability. The proposed consent order specifically requires that the divestitures occur no later than twenty days after Jobsite merges with and into Fred Meyer and Fred Meyer becomes a wholly-owned subsidiary of Kroger or four months after the Proposed Respondents signed the proposed consent order (April 29, 1999), whichever is earlier. The proposed consent agreement also requires Kroger to include rescission provisions in its upfront buyer agreements that allow it to rescind the transaction(s) if the Commission, after the comment period, decides to reject any of the upfront buyers. If Kroger divests the supermarkets to be divested prior to the date the proposed consent order becomes final, and if, at the time the Commission decides to make the proposed consent order final, the Commission notifies Kroger that any of the upfront buyers is not an acceptable acquirer or that any of the upfront buyer agreements is not an acceptable manner of divestiture, then Kroger must immediately rescind the transaction in question and divest those assets within three months after the proposed consent order becomes final. At that time, Kroger must divest those assets only to an acquirer that receives the prior approval of the Commission and only in a manner that receives the prior approval of the Commission. In the event that any Commission-approved buyer is unable to take or keep possession of any of the supermarkets identified for divestiture, a trustee that the Commission may appoint has the power to divest any of the supermarkets or properties in the markets alleged in Paragraph 13 of the complaint that the Proposed Respondents own to remedy the anticompetitive effects alleged in the complaint. The Commission's goal in evaluating possible purchasers of divested assets is to maintain the competitive environment that existed prior to the acquisition. When divestiture is an appropriate remedy for a supermarket merger, the Commission requires the merging parties to find a buyer for the divested stores. A proposed buyer must not itself present competitive problems. For example, the Commission is less likely to approve a buyer that already has a large retail presence in the relevant geographic area than a buyer without such a presence. The Commission is satisfied that the purchasers presented by the parties are well qualified to run the divested stores and that divestiture to these purchasers poses no separate competitive issues. For a period of ten years from the date the proposed consent order becomes final, Kroger is required to provide notice to the Commission prior to acquiring supermarket assets located in, or any interest (such as stock) in any entity that owns or operates a supermarket located in, Cochise, Yavapai, or Yuma counties, Arizona; Laramie or Sweetwater counties, Wyoming; or Carbon County, Utah. Kroger may not complete such an acquisition until it has provided information requested by the Commission. This provision does not restrict Kroger from constructing new supermarket facilities on its own; nor does it restrict Kroger from leasing facilities not operated as supermarkets within the previous six months. For a period of ten years, the proposed consent order also prohibits Kroger from entering into or enforcing any agreement that restricts the ability of any person that acquires any supermarket, any leasehold interest in any supermarket, or any interest in any retail location used as a supermarket on or after January 1, 1998, to operate a supermarket at that site if such supermarket was formerly owned or operated by Kroger in Cochise, Yavapai, or Yuma counties, Arizona; Laramie or Sweetwater counties, Wyoming; or Carbon County, Utah. In addition, Kroger may not remove fixtures or equipment from a store or property owned or leased in Cochise, Yavapai, or Yuma counties, Arizona; Laramie or Sweetwater counties, Wyoming; or Carbon County, Utah, that is no longer in operation as a supermarket, except (1) prior to a sale, sublease, assignment, or change in occupancy or (2) to relocate such fixtures or equipment in the ordinary course of business to any other supermarket owned or operated by Kroger. The Proposed Respondents are required to provide to the Commission a report of compliance with the proposed consent order within thirty days following the date on which they signed the proposed consent and every thirty days thereafter until the divestitures are completed. Kroger is required to provide to the Commission a report of compliance annually for a period of ten years. The obligations of Jobsite under the proposed consent order will terminate upon consummation of the proposed acquisition. V. Opportunity for Public Comment The proposed consent order has been placed on the public record for 60 days for receipt of comments by interested persons. Comments received during this period will become part of the public record. After 60 days, the Commission will again review the agreement and the comments received and will decide whether it should withdraw from the agreement or make the proposed consent order final. By accepting the proposed consent order subject to final approval, the Commission anticipates that the competitive problems alleged in the complaint will be resolved. The purpose of this analysis is to invite public comment on the proposed consent order, including the proposed sale of supermarkets to Nash-Finch, Albertson's, and Fleming, in order to aid the Commission in its determination of whether to make the proposed consent order final. This analysis is not intended to constitute an official interpretation of the proposed consent order nor is it intended to modify the terms of the proposed consent order in any way. 1. The HHI is a measurement of market concentration calculated by summing the squares of the individual market shares of all the participants. |