El .gov significa que es oficial.
Los sitios web del gobierno federal siempre usan un dominio .gov o .mil. Antes de compartir información confidencial en línea, asegúrese de estar en un sitio .gov o .mil.
Este sitio es seguro.
El https:// medios todos los datos transmitidos son cifrados - en otras palabras, cualquier información o el historial de navegación que proporcione se transmite de forma segura.
Every year the FTC brings hundreds of cases against individuals and companies for violating consumer protection and competition laws that the agency enforces. These cases can involve fraud, scams, identity theft, false advertising, privacy violations, anti-competitive behavior and more. The Legal Library has detailed information about cases we have brought in federal court or through our internal administrative process, called an adjudicative proceeding.
The complaint, issued with the consent order, alleged that as a result of Merck's 1993 acquisition of Medco, the nation's largest benefits manager, Merck's drugs received favorable treatment through Medco's drug-list formulary made available to medical professionals who prescribe and dispense prescriptions to health plan beneficiaries. The consent order requires Medco, among other things, to maintain an "open formulary" to include drugs approved by an independent Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee, staffed by physicians and pharmacologists who have no financial interest in Merck.
To settle FTC charges, LaFarge, Corp. agreed to restructure its agreement to purchase certain assets of Holnam, Inc. LaFarge and Holnam are two of five competitors in the portland cement market in the Puget Sound area. In February 1998, LaFarge and Holnam signed a letter of intent detailing an agreement under which LaFarge would buy Holnam's Seattle cement plant, cement distribution terminal in Vancouver, Washington, a rock quarry in Twin Rivers, Washington, and related assets. The FTC alleged that a provision of the sales agreement between LaFarge and Holnam would have imposed a penalty on LaFarge if it produced quantities of cement in excess of 85 percent of the Holnam plant's capacity. According to the FTC, this provision would encourage LaFarge to restrict the output of cement at the Seattle plant to avoid the production penalty and would prevent an increase in supply and a reduction in price for cement in the Puget Sound area. To restore competition, LaFarge and Holnam agreed to drop the production penalty clause.