Tag: Competition

On 4/8/2013, Bosley, Inc., the nation’s largest manager of medical/surgical hair restoration procedures, settled Federal Trade Commission charges that it illegally exchanged competitively sensitive, nonpublic information about its business practices with one of its competitors, HC (USA), Inc., commonly known as Hair Club, in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act. In settling the FTC’s charges, Bosley has agreed not to communicate such information in the future, and will institute an antitrust compliance program. The FTC alleged that for at least the past four years, Bosley exchanged competitively sensitive, nonpublic information about its business operations with Hair Club. The information exchanged by the companies’ CEOs included details about future product offerings, surgical hair transplantation price floors and discounts, plans for business expansion and contraction, and current business operations and performance.

The FTC issued an administrative complaint on 7/17/2010 alleging that the state dental board in North Carolina is harming competition by blocking non-dentists from providing teeth-whitening services in the state. The FTC charged that the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners impermissibly ordered non-dentists to stop providing teeth-whitening services, which has made it harder to obtain these services and more expensive for North Carolina consumers. According to the FTC’s administrative complaint, teeth-whitening services are much less expensive when performed by non-dentist than when performed by dentists. In an Initial Decision issued July 14, 2011, the ALJ found that non-dentists compete with dentists to provide teeth whitening services in North Carolina and that the Dental Board's concerted action to exclude non-dentist-provided teeth whitening services from the market had a tendency to harm competition. The ALJ further found that the Dental Board's action had no valid pro competitive justification and constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade and an unfair method of competition. On February 8, 2011, the Commission denied the respondent's motion to dismiss, ruling that the Board's actions were not entitled to state action immunity. The Commission ruled that because the Board is controlled by practicing dentists, its condcut must be actively supervised by the state. OnDecember 7, 2011, the Commission issued an Opinion concluding that the Dental Board violated of Section 5 of the FTC Act, and agreed with the ALJ that the Dental Board's conduct "constituted concerte action, . . . had a tendency to harm competition and did in fact harm competition," and had no legitimate pro-competitive justification. The Commission concluded that the Dental Board's conduct could be deemed illegal under the "inherently suspect" mode of analysis because the challenged conduct had a clear tendency to suppress competition and lacked any countervailing procompetitive virtue. On May 3, 2013, the Fourth Circuit denied the Board's petition to review the Commission's decision and on 2/25/15, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

On 9/25/2012, Biglari Holdings, Inc., a publicly traded holding company, agreed to pay $850,000 to resolve Federal Trade Commission allegations that it violated premerger reporting laws in connection with its 2011 acquisition of a stake in the restaurant operator Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. At the request of the FTC, the U.S. Department of Justice has filed a complaint for civil penalties, alleging that Biglari improperly failed to report the transaction to U.S. antitrust authorities by claiming the purchases were a “passive” investment when, in reality, Biglari intended to become actively involved in the management of Cracker Barrel. The complaint alleges that, at the time of its acquisitions, Biglari Holdings intended to actively participate in the management of Cracker Barrel, including seeking a seat on the company’s board of directors. As a result, Biglari Holdings was ineligible for the passive investor exemption and was required to submit an HSR notification before acquiring shares of Cracker Barrel in excess of $66 million.

The FTC required hospital management company Universal Health Services, Inc. to sell an acute inpatient psychiatric facility in the El Paso, Texas/Santa Teresa, New Mexico area to settle charges that UHS’s proposed acquisition of Ascend Health Corporation would be anticompetitive. As proposed, the deal allegedly would lead to a virtual monopoly in the provision of acute inpatient psychiatric services to commercially insured patients in the El Paso/Santa Teresa area.  The FTC's final order requires UHS to sell its Peak Behavioral Health Services facility within six months to an FTC-approved buyer. In addition, to ensure that the Peak assets are able to attract a buyer that can effectively compete with UHS after the sale, the proposed order allows the Commission to require a second UHS hospital, Mesilla Valley Hospital in Las Cruces, New Mexico, to be sold together with Peak if Peak alone is not divested to an approved buyer within six months.

The FTC accepted a consent order settling charges that Charlotte Pipe and Foundry Company’s 2010 purchase of Star Pipe Products, Inc.’s cast iron soil pipe (CISP) business was anticompetitive. To help restore competition in CISP markets in the United States, the order prohibits Charlotte Pipe from enforcing a confidentiality and non-compete agreement with Star Pipe, ensures that Charlotte Pipe will publicly disclose its prior acquisitions of other CISP importers, and requires Charlotte Pipe to notify the Commission before making future acquisitions in this industry. CISP products are important components of pipeline systems used to transport wastewater from buildings to municipal sewage systems, to vent plumbing systems, and to transport rainwater to storm drains.