Tag: Competition

The Commission charged that West Penn Multi-List, operator of the only MLS service for the Pittsburgh metropolitan area, unreasonablay restricted access to its MLS services, which restrained competition.  Specifically, West Penn’s MLS rules limited publication and marketing of the listing of sellers’ properties based solely on the terms of the seller’s listing contract with the real estate broker. The MLS provider limited MLS access to those brokers with a traditional full-time listing agreement with their seller, thus constraining the ability of brokers with non-traditional listing agreements to compete.  To settle the charges, West Penn agreed to a consent order which prohibits West Penn from adopting or enforcing rules that (1) require brokers to comply with the MLS form contract and submit copies of their listing contracts to the MLS, and that (2) discourage brokers and home sellers from contracting for services for terms of less than a year.

In December 2008, the Commission settled antitrust concerns raised by the proposed $8.9 billion acquisition of Barr Pharmaceuticals by Teva Pharmaceutical Industries. The proposed acquisition would have lessened competition in the markets for 17 commonly used generic medications including drugs used in the treatment of cancer, bacterial infections, diabetes, acid reflux, and depression as well as several varieties of oral contraceptives. According to the Commission’s complaint, the acquisition would have likely led to higher prices for consumers through the removal of one of only four competitors in each of these markets. The Commission’s consent agreement requires both Teva and Barr to sell assets in 29 U.S. markets to either Watson Pharmaceuticals or Qualitest Pharmaceuticals.

In late 2008, the Commission issued a consent order to restore competition in the market for oral long-acting opioids (LAOs). The FTC intervened in King Pharmaceutical’s proposed $1.6 billion acquisition of rival drug-maker Alpharma Inc. because the transaction would have joined the two leading producers of morphine sulfate oral LAO’s in the United States, a market which was already highly concentrated and which had annual sales of $4 billion in 2007. In order to maintain competition in the market, the Commission’s consent order requires King to divest its Kadian business to Actavis, a company which already manufactured the drug for King, and which could then produce a generic equivalent of the drug sooner than would have been permitted under King’s patent, which would not have expired until 2010.

The Commission challenged the conduct of AllCare IPA, alleging that AllCare restrained competition in fee-for-service contracts by fixing prices and other contract terms with payers, engaging in collective negotiations over the terms and conditions of dealing with payers, and preventing group members from negotiating with payers except on terms approved by All Care. The Commission issued a consent order prohibiting All Care from entering into agreements between or among physicians: 1) to negotiate on behalf of any physician with any payer; 2) to refuse to deal, or threaten to refuse to deal, with any payer; 3) to designate the terms, conditions, or requirements upon which any physician deals, or is willing to deal, with any payer, including, but not limited to price terms; 4) not to deal individually with any payer, or not to deal with any payer through any arrangement other than one involving All Care.

The Commission issued an administrative complaint to challenge Oldcastle Architectural’s (a subsidiary of CRH) proposed $540 million acquisition of Pavestone Companies as anticompetitive in the US market for drycast concrete hardscape products sold to retailers such as The Home Depot, Lowe’s, and Wal-Mart Stores. According to the complaint, the acquisition would reduce competition by combining the only two companies capable of the national manufacture and sale of these heavy products, which include concrete pavers, segmented retaining wall blocks, and concrete patio products, due to the difficulty in distribution of such products, and the fact that both Oldcastle and Pavestone already possess large distribution networks. The acquisition as proposed would result in Oldcastle gaining a 90% market share for the manufacture and sale of these drycast products to home centers in the United States. The Commission also authorized staff to file a complaint in federal court seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to prevent consummation of the proposed transaction, but the respondents decided not to proceed with the proposed merger and the Commission dismissed the administrative complaint.

In order to restore competition in the U.S. market for consumer pregnancy tests, the Commission effectively reversed a consummated transaction in which Inverness Medical Innovations, a 70% market share holder, purchased the assets related to the development of a water-soluble dye based pregnancy test from ACON Laboratories in order to protect its monopoly power in the market. According to the Commission’s complaint, Inverness restrained competition in two ways. First, Inverness issued covenants not to compete to ACON, took profits from ACON’s joint venture with Church & Dwight, and purchased intellectual property rights which would restrict ACON from developing competing products. Second, Inverness limited product innovation by purchasing, but not using, the water-soluble dye test technology purchased from ACON, one of the only companies utilizing that technology. The Commission’s consent order ended any restrictions Inverness had over the joint venture between ACON and Church & Dwight, and required that Inverness divest its assets relating to the water-soluble dye technology, and its related pregnancy test product.

The Commission sought a federal court temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, and issued an administrative complaint, against Whole Food Market, Inc.’s proposed acquisition of Wild Oats Markets, Inc. According to the complaint, the approximately $670 million deal raised competition problems in 21 local markets where Whole Foods and Wild Oats both operated stores and were each other’s closest competitors among premium national and organic supermarkets. The district court granted the TRO, but subsequently denied the preliminary injunction, concluding that the merger’s likely effect would not be substantially to reduce competition in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The Commission appealed the district court’s ruling on grounds that the lower court failed to apply the proper legal standard that governs preliminary injunction applications by the Commission in Section 7 cases. The appellate court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings to determine if the proposed $670 million deal raised competition problems in numerous local markets where Whole Foods and Wild Oats both operated premium natural and organic supermarkets. In a settlement on March 6, 2009, Whole Foods agreed to sell the name brand of Wild Oats, along with 32 of the company’s stores.

There is a related administrative proceeding.