Tag: Manufacturing

ON Semiconductor Corporation agreed to sell its Ignition IGBT business in order to settle charges that its proposed $2.4 billion acquisition of Fairchild Semiconductor International, Inc. would likely substantially lessen competition in the worldwide market for Ignition IGBTs, resulting in higher prices and reduced innovation. Ignition IGBTs are semiconductors that function as solid-state electronic switches in the ignition systems of automotive internal combustion engines.  The order preserves competition by requiring ON to divest its Ignition IGBT business to Chicago-based manufacturer Littelfuse, Inc. The divestiture includes design files and intellectual property that Littelfuse needs to manufacture ON’s Ignition IGBTs. ON must also facilitate the transfer of its customer relationships to Littelfuse, and supply Ignition IGBTs for Littlefuse to sell to customers while Littelfuse sets up its manufacturing operations.

Fortiline, LLC, a company that distributes ductile iron pipe, fittings and accessories throughout much of the United States, agreed to  settle charges that it violated federal antitrust law by inviting a competitor to raise and fix prices. This is the first case where the FTC has challenged an invitation to collude by a firm that is both a direct competitor with, and a distributor for, the invitee. According to an administrative complaint filed by the FTC, on two occasions in 2010, Fortiline invited a competing firm, which mainly manufactures ductile iron pipe but also engaged in direct sales to contractors, to collude on pricing in North Carolina and most of Virginia. In some areas, Fortiline competes with this firm – identified in the complaint as “Manufacturer A” – by distributing ductile iron pipe (“DIP”) products made by another DIP manufacturer, identified as “Manufacturer B.” In other areas, Fortiline distributes the product of Manufacturer A. The FTC’s complaint alleges that on two occasions when Fortiline was competing with Manufacturer A, Fortiline communicated an invitation to collude on DIP pricing.The proposed consent order prohibits Fortiline from entering into, attempting to enter into, or inviting any agreement with any competitor to raise or fix prices, divide markets, or allocate customers.

Ball Corporation has agreed to sell to Ardagh Group S.A. eight U.S. aluminum can plants and associated assets in order to settle charges that its proposed $8.4 billion acquisition of Rexam PLC is likely anticompetitive. According to the complaint, the acquisition would eliminate direct competition in the United States between Ball and Rexam, which are the first and second largest manufacturers of aluminum beverage cans in both the United States and the world. The complaint alleges without a divestiture, it is likely that the proposed merger would substantially lessen competition for standard 12-ounce aluminum cans in three regional U.S. markets – the South and Southeast, the Midwest, and the West. The complaint also alleges that the proposed merger would substantially lessen competition for specialty aluminum cans nationwide. Ball and Rexam produce specialty aluminum cans that range in size from 7.5 ounces to 24 ounces, come in different shapes, and are used to market a wide variety of different products such as portioncontrolled drinks and energy drinks. Under the terms of the consent agreement, Ball and Rexam are required to divest eight aluminum can plants and related assets in the United States to Ardagh, one of the world’s largest producers of glass bottles for the beverage industry and metal cans for the food industry. Ardagh will acquire aluminum can body plants in Fairfield, Calif., Chicago, Ill., Whitehouse, Ohio, Fremont, Ohio, Winston-Salem, N.C., Bishopville, S.C., and Olive Branch, Miss., and Rexam’s aluminum can end plant located in Valparaiso, Ind.. Ardagh also will acquire Rexam’s U.S. headquarters in Chicago, Ill., and Rexam’s U.S. Technical Center in Elk Grove, Ill.

Invibio agreed to settle charges that it used long-term supply contracts to exclude rivals and maintain its monopoly in implant-grade polyetheretherketone, known as PEEK, which is sold to medical device makers. The FTC’s complaint alleges that two other companies,Solvay Specialty Polymers LLC and Evonik Corporation, later entered the implant-grade PEEK market, but Invibio’s anticompetitive tactics impeded them from effectively competing for customers. Through these exclusive contracting practices, the complaint alleges that Invibio has been able to maintain high prices for PEEK, despite entry from Solvay and Evonik; to prevent its customers from using more than one source of supply, despite their business preference to do so; and to impede Solvay and Evonik from developing into fully effective competitors. Under the consent order, Invibio, Inc. and Invibio Limited, along with their corporate parent, Victrex plc, are generally prohibited from entering into exclusive supply contracts and from preventing current customers from using an alternate source of PEEK in new products. In addition, the companies must allow current customers meeting certain conditions to modify existing contracts to eliminate the requirement that the customer purchase PEEK for existing products exclusively from Invibio.

The FTC filed an administrative complaint charging that the proposed $982 million merger of Canadian chemical suppliers Superior Plus Corp. and Canexus Corp. would violate the antitrust laws by significantly reducing competition in the North American market for sodium chlorate – a commodity chemical used to bleach wood pulp that is then processed into paper, tissue, diaper liners, and other products. Superior and Canexus are two of the three major producers of sodium chlorate in North America. If the merger takes place, the new company and rival AkzoNobel will control approximately 80 percent of the total sodium chlorate production capacity in North America.  By combining more than half of all North American sodium chlorate production capacity in the merged Superior and Canexus, the acquisition is likely to lead to anticompetitive reductions in output and higher prices, the complaint alleges. Additionally, by removing Canexus as an independent sodium chlorate producer, with its large scale and low-costs, the acquisition will also increase the likelihood of coordination in an already vulnerable market, according to the complaint.  The FTC also authorized staff to seek a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction in federal court to prevent the parties from consummating the merger and to maintain the status quo pending the administrative proceeding. The FTC and the Canadian Competition Bureau collaborated in this investigation.  On June 30, the parties abandoned their plans.

NXP Semiconductors N.V. agreed to sell its RF power amplifier assets in order to settle charges that its proposed $11.8 billion acquisition of Freescale Semiconductor Ltd. would substantially lessen competition in the worldwide market for RF power amplifiers, likely resulting in higher prices and reduced innovation. The proposed consent order preserves competition by requiring NXP to divest all its assets that are used primarily for manufacturing, research, and development of RF power amplifiers to the Chinese private equity firm Jianguang Asset Management Co. Ltd. These assets include a manufacturing facility in the Philippines, a building in the Netherlands to house management and some testing labs, as well as all patents and technologies used exclusively or predominantly for the RF power amplifier business, and a royalty-free license to use all other NXP patents and technologies required by that business. The divestiture also includes all of NXP’s RF power amplifier employees and managers.

As part of a settlement, The Coca-Cola Company agreed to restrict its access to confidential competitive business information of rival Dr Pepper Snapple Group as a condition for completing Coca-Cola’s proposed $12.3 billion acquisition of its largest North American bottler, which also distributes Dr Pepper Snapple carbonated soft drinks. In a complaint filed with the settlement, the FTC charged that access to cmmercially sensitive information likely would have harmed competition in the U.S. markets for carbonated soft drinks.Under the settlement with the FTC, Coca-Cola will set up a “firewall” to ensure that its ownership of the bottling company does not give certain Coca-Cola employees access to commercially sensitive confidential Dr Pepper Snapple marketing information and brand plans.