Legal Library: Cases and Proceedings

Supermarket operators Albertsons and Safeway Inc. agreed to sell 168 supermarkets to settle FTC charges that their proposed $9.2 billion merger would likely be anticompetitive in 130 local markets in Arizona, California, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. Under the settlement, Haggen Holdings, LLC will acquire 146 Albertsons and Safeway stores located in Arizona, California, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington; Supervalu Inc. will acquire two Albertsons stores in Washington; Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. will acquire 12 Albertsons and Safeway stores in Texas; and Associated Food Stores Inc. will acquire eight Albertsons and Safeway stores in Montana and Wyoming. It is expected that Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. will assign its operating rights in the 12 Texas stores it is acquiring to RLS Supermarkets, LLC (doing business as Minyard Food Stores) and that Associated Food Stores Inc. will assign its rights in the eight Montana and Wyoming stores it is acquiring to Missoula Fresh Market LLC, Ridley’s Family Markets, Inc., and Stokes Inc.

Enbridge Inc. and Spectra Energy Corp agreed to settle FTC charges that their proposed merger likely would harm competition in the market for pipeline transportation of natural gas in three production areas off the coast of Louisiana. According to the FTC’s complaint, the merger likely would reduce natural gas pipeline competition in three offshore natural gas producing areas in the Gulf of Mexico—Green Canyon, Walker Ridge and Keathley Canyon—leading to higher prices for natural gas pipeline transportation from those areas. In portions of the affected areas, the FTC alleged, the merging parties’ pipelines are the two pipelines located closest to certain wells and, as a result, are likely the lowest cost pipeline transportation options for those wells. According to the FTC, the merger would give Canada-based Enbridge an ownership interest in both pipelines, which will give it access to competitively sensitive information of the Discovery Pipeline, as well as significant voting rights over the Discovery Pipeline. Access to its competitor’s competitively sensitive information and significant voting rights would provide Enbridge with the incentive and opportunity to unilaterally increase pipeline transportation costs for natural gas producers located in the affected areas. The exchange of information also may increase the likelihood of tacit or explicit anticompetitive coordination between the Walker Ridge Pipeline and the Discovery Pipeline. Under the settlement with the FTC, the companies have agreed to conditions that will preserve competition in those areas.The consent agreement requires Enbridge to establish firewalls to limit its access to non-public information about the Discovery Pipeline. Board members of the Spectra-affiliated companies that hold a 40 percent share in the Discovery Pipeline must recuse themselves from any vote involving the pipeline, with two limited exceptions. Also under the order, Enbridge must notify the Commission before acquiring an ownership interest in any natural gas pipeline operating in the Green Canyon, Walker Ridge and Keathley Canyon areas, or increasing the 40 percent ownership interest of Spectra affiliate DCP Midstream Partners, LP in the Discovery Pipeline.

OFTACOOP, a Puerto Rico ophthalmologist cooperative, has agreed to settle FTC charges that its actions harmed competition.  The complaint charges that  OFTACOOP – also known as Cooperativa de Médico Oftalmólogos de Puerto Rico –  unlawfully orchestrated an agreement among competing ophthalmologists to refuse to deal with a health plan, MCS Advantage, Inc., and its network administrator, Eye Management of Puerto Rico, LLC.  OFTACOOP’s concerted refusal to deal forced MCS to abandon its plan to engage Eye Management to create a lower-cost network of ophthalmologists. MCS was also forced to maintain its then-current reimbursement rates paid to ophthalmologists. According to the complaint, OFTACOOP restrained competition without any justification, in violation of federal antitrust law.  The proposed consent order prohibits OFTACOOP from entering into or facilitating agreements between or among ophthalmologists (1) to refuse to deal, or threaten to refuse to deal, with any payor regarding any term, including price terms, or (2) not to deal individually with any payor, or not to deal with any payor other than through OFTACOOP. The order also prohibits information exchanges to facilitate any prohibited conduct, and it bars any attempts to engage in any prohibited conduct. OFTACOOP is also barred from encouraging, suggesting, advising, pressuring, inducing, or trying to induce anyone to engage in any prohibited conduct.

Boehringer Ingelheim agreed to divest five types of animal health products in the United States in order to settle FTC charges that its proposed asset swap with Sanofi would likely be anticompetitive. Under the proposed swap, Boehringer Ingelheim acquired Sanofi’s animal care subsidiary, Merial, valued at $13.53 billion, and Sanofi obtained Boehringer Ingelheim’s consumer health care business unit, valued at $7.98 billion, as well as cash compensation of $5.54 billion. The FTC’s complaint alleges that without the divestitures the proposed asset swap would harm competition in the U.S. markets for various vaccines for companion animals (pets) and certain parasite control products for cattle and sheep. The proposed consent order preserves competition by requiring Boehringer Ingelheim to divest the companion animal vaccines to Eli Lilly and the company’s Elanco Animal Health division, and the parasite control products to Bayer AG.

Abbott Laboratories agreed to divest two medical device businesses to settle FTC charges that its proposed $25 billion acquisition of St. Jude Medical, Inc. would likely be anticompetitive. The FTC’s complaint alleges that without a remedy, the proposed acquisition would harm competition in the U.S. markets for vascular closure devices, which are used to close holes in arteries from the insertion of catheters, and for “steerable” sheaths, which are used to guide catheters for treating heart arrhythmias. Without a remedy, the merger will cause significant harm to competition in these two markets. The consent order requires the parties to divest to Tokyo-based medical device maker Terumo Corporation all rights and assets related to St. Jude’s vascular closure device business and Abbott’s steerable sheath business. The order requires both companies to assist Terumo with establishing its manufacturing capabilities. Under the order, Abbott is also required to notify the FTC if it intends to acquire lesion-assessing ablation catheter assets from Advanced Cardiac Therapeutics, known as ACT. Lesion-assessing ablation catheters provide feedback to physicians regarding the force being applied by the catheter or the temperature of the ablation target. Currently, only St. Jude and one other company provide lesion assessing ablation catheters in the United States. Abbott and ACT have formed a partnership to develop these catheters. After the acquisition of St. Jude, if Abbott acquired lesion-assessing ablation catheter assets from ACT, it could eliminate additional competition that would result from an independent ACT.

Valeant Pharmaceuticals, the parent of Bausch + Lomb, agreed to sell Paragon Holdings I, Inc. to settle charges that its May 2015 acquisition of Paragon reduced competition for the sale of FDA-approved buttons used for three types of gas permeable, or GP, lenses: orthokeratology lenses, worn to reshape the cornea; large-diameter scleral lenses, which cover the white of the eye and are used after eye surgery, for corneal transplants, and to treat eye disease; and general vision correction lenses. Valeant will sell Paragon in its entirety to a newly created entity, Paragon Companies LLC, headed by the former president of Paragon, Joe Sicari. Under the settlement, Paragon Companies also will acquire the assets of Pelican Products LLC – a contact lens packaging company that Valeant acquired after its purchase of Paragon – that is the only producer of FDA-approved vials used for shipping some GP lenses.

The FTC's order requires CentraCare Health, a healthcare provider in St. Cloud, Minnesota, to release some physicians from “non-compete” contract clauses, allowing them to join competing practices, under a settlement mitigating likely anticompetitive effects from CentraCare’s proposed merger with St. Cloud Medical Group (“SCMG”). CentraCare Health, a non-profit health system in central Minnesota, also includes a multi-specialty physician practice group. SCMG is a physician-owned, multi-specialty practice group that operates four clinics in and around St. Cloud. According to the FTC, CentraCare’s planned acquisition of SCMG would combine the two largest providers of adult primary care, pediatric, and OB/GYN services in the St. Cloud area. By eliminating SCMG as a potential alternative in the St. Cloud area, the acquisition would likely increase CentraCare’s bargaining power vis-à-vis commercial health plans, allowing it to raise reimbursement rates and secure more favorable terms, the complaint states. However, SCMG was failing financially, and a number of physicians had already left the practice. SCMG’s multi-year search did not identify an alternative purchaser to CentraCare for the entire group, but at least one local provider has expressed interest in expanding its practice by hiring some of SCMG’s physicians. The consent order permitted the acquisition to proceed, but lessened its potential anticompetitive effects by requiring CentraCare to allow a number of adult primary care, pediatric, and OB/GYN physicians to leave the health system and work for other local providers or establish a new practice in the area and to provide certain financial incentives to a number of departing physicians.

American Air Liquide Holdings, Inc. and Airgas, Inc., agreed to divest certain production and distribution assets to settle charges that their proposed $13.4 billion merger likely would have harmed competition and led to higher prices in several U.S. and regional markets. The companies will sell assets used to produce and supply seven types of industrial gas: bulk oxygen, bulk nitrogen, bulk argon, bulk nitrous oxide, bulk liquid carbon dioxide, dry ice, and packaged welding gases sold in retail stores. These gases are used in a number of industries, including oil and gas, steelmaking, health care, and food manufacturing, according to the complaint. Under the proposed settlement order, Air Liquide will sell these assets to a Commission-approved buyer within four months after it acquires Airgas. The proposed consent agreement includes an asset maintenance order to ensure that Air Liquide and Airgas continue to act independently and maintain the relevant assets until they are divested.

German cement producer HeidelbergCement AG and Italian producer Italcementi S.p.A. agreed to divest a cement plant in Martinsburg, WV and up to 11 cement distribution terminals in six other states to settle charges that their proposed $4.2 billion merger would likely harm competition in five regional markets for cement in the United States. Heidelberg and Italcementi are the second and fourth largest producers of cement in the world, and in the United States, the two companies compete through their respective U.S. subsidiaries, Lehigh Hanson and Essroc Cement Corp., to sell portland cement – an essential ingredient in making concrete. According to the FTC complaint, the merger as proposed would harm competition for portland cement in five metropolitan areas: Baltimore-Washington, DC; Richmond, Virginia; Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, Virginia; Syracuse, New York; and Indianapolis, Indiana. In each of these markets, the FTC alleges the merger as originally proposed would have reduced the number of competitively significant suppliers from three to two. The proposed consent agreement requires the merged company to divest to an FTC-approved buyer an Essroc cement plant and quarry in Martinsburg, West Virginia; seven Essroc terminals in Maryland, Virginia and Pennsylvania; and a Lehigh terminal in Solvay, New York. At the buyer’s option, the order also requires the merged company to divest two additional Essroc terminals in Ohio. Under the proposed order, these divestitures must occur within 120 days after the merger is complete. In addition, the merged company has ten days after the merger is complete to divest Essroc’s terminal in Indianapolis to Cemex, Inc.