Tag: Merger

In an administrative complaint issued on October 25, 2001, the Commission challenged the February 2001 purchase of the Water Division and Engineered Construction Division of Pitt-Des Moines, Inc. alleging that the consummated merger significantly reduced competition in four separate markets involving the design and construction of various types of field-erected specialty industrial storage tanks in the United States. On June 27, 2003, an administrative law judge upheld the complaint and ordered the divestiture all of the assets acquired in the acquisition. In December 2004, the Commission approved an interim consent order prohibiting Chicago Bridge & Iron from altering the assets acquired from Pitt-Des Moines, Inc. except “in the ordinary course of business.” These assets included but were not limited to real property; personal property; equipment; inventories; and intellectual property. On January 7, 2005 the Commission upheld in part the ruling of an administrative law judge that Chicago Bridge & Iron’s acquisition of the Water Division and the Engineered Construction Division of Pitt-Des Moines, Inc. created a near-monopoly in four separate markets involving the design and construction of various types of field-erected specialty industrial storage tanks in the United States. In an effort to restore competition as it existed prior to the merger, the Commission ordered Chicago Bridge to reorganize the relevant product business into two separate, stand-alone, viable entities capable of competing in the markets described in the complaint and to divest one of those entities within six months. On January 25, 2008 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the Commission's order.  In November 2008, the Commission approved divestiture of the assets to Matrix Service Company.

In August 2006, the FTC approved a final consent order relating to the proposed $14.4 billion acquisition of the BOC Group by Linde requiring Linde to divest Air Separation Units (ASUs), bulk refined helium assets, and other assets in eight localities across the United States. The consent order aims to maintain competition in the markets for liquid oxygen, liquid helium, and bulk refined helium in several U.S. markets.

The Commission charged that Agrium, Inc.’s $2.65 billion proposed acquisition of UAP Holding Corporation would substantially lessen competition in the market for the retail sale of bulk fertilizer and, in some cases, related services by farm stores, in several local markets in Michigan and Maryland. The Commission’s order requires the divestiture of seven farm stores, five UAP stores in Michigan, and two Agrium locations on the eastern shore of Maryland.

The Commission challenged Fresenius Medical Care’s proposed purchase of an exclusive sublicense for the manufacture and supply of the drug Venofer to US dialysis clinics from Daiichi Sankyo Company. Venofer is an intravenously administered iron sucrose preparation used primarily to treat iron-deficiency anemia in dialysis patients with chronic kidney disease. The agreement would have given Fresenius, the largest operator of dialysis clinics in the country, the ability to artificially inflate its internal costs for Venofer, and effectively increase Medicare reimbursement payments for all buyers of the drug. In order to settle these concerns about anticompetitive self-dealing, the Commission issued a consent order restricting Fresenius from reporting internally inflated Venofer prices by mandating that the current market price for the drug be used in reporting the average selling price to Medicare.

The Commission challenged Pernod Ricard SA’s proposed $9 billion acquisition of V&S Vin & Spirit as harmful to competition among suppliers of “super-premium” vodka. The proposed deal would have merged the two leading brands, Absolut and Stolichnaya, and allowed Pernod to raise prices profitably on both brands. Additionally, the complaint alleges that the markets for cognac, domestic cordials, coffee liqueur, and popular gin would be subject to anticompetitive effects because sensitive pricing and promotion information for Beam Global Brands, a competitor in these product markets, would be available to Pernod after the acquisition as a result of Beam’s joint venture with V&S. The Commission settled the charges by requiring Pernod to divest its distribution interests in Stolichnaya Vodka, and to erect a firewall to prevent the sharing of any competitively sensitive information from Beam Global Brands with Pernod employees.

The Commission charged that Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd’s proposed acquisition of Taro Pharmaceuticals Industries, Ltd would substantially reduce competition, likely resulting in higher prices for three distinct generic formulations of the anticonvulsant drug carbamazepine, used widely as an antiepileptic and to prevent and control seizures. The proposed deal would have reduced the number of drug suppliers to a level where the number of competitors has a direct and substantial impact on prices. In order to remedy these concerns, Sun agreed to divest all of its rights and assets needed to develop three generic forms of carbamazepine: 1) immediate-release tablets; 2) chewable tablets; and 3) extended-release tablets.

The Commission challenged the proposed acquisition by Carlyle Partners IV, L.P. of INEOS Group Ltd., alleging that the deal would be anticompetitive in the highly concentrated Midwestern market for sodium silicate. Sodium silicates are used in detergents and other products, and are important chemicals used by the pulp and paper industry. The acquisition would have joined market leader PQ Corporation, which is owned by Carlyle, with INEOS, the third-largest sodium silicate provider. Under the Commission’s order, Carlyle must divest PQ’s sodium silicate plant in Utica, Illinois, and all associated intellectual property required to operate the plant to Oak Hill Company within five days of consummating the transaction.

The Commission challenged McCormick & Company’s $605 million acquisition of Lawry’s and Adolph’s brands of seasoned salt products from Unilever N.V., alleging that the transaction would be detrimental to competition in the highly concentrated U.S. market for seasoned salts. According to the Commission’s complaint, the proposed deal would combine the two companies that comprise almost the entire $100 million market for seasoned salt, increasing the likelihood that McCormick would be able unilaterally to increase prices. McCormick agreed to divest its Season-All business to Morton, an FTC approved buyer, within 10 days of completing the acquisition.

The Commission challenged Flow International Corporation’s proposed $109 million acquisition of rival waterjet manufacturer OMAX Corporation. Both corporations develop, manufacture, and sell computerized waterjet cutting systems which use pressurized water mixed with abrasive garnet particles to cut various materials, including steel and stone. The proposed acquisition would have united the two largest competitors in the market for the manufacture and sale of computerized waterjet cutting systems and allowed Flow to exercise market power and increase prices. Furthermore, the Commission charged that entry would be very unlikely because OMAX received two broad patents relating to the control systems for waterjet cutting systems. The Commission approved a consent agreement requiring OMAX to grant any request for a royalty-free license for its controller patents.

The Commission challenged a series of acquisitions by TALX Corporation, a fully owned subsidiary of Equifax, Inc., that lessened competition in the markets for outsourced unemployment compensation management (UCM) and verification of income and employment (VOIE) services. Unemployment compensation management services consist of the administration of unemployment compensation claims filed with a state or territory. Verification of income and employment services consists of providing income and employment information on behalf of employers to third parties, such as lenders or other creditors. According to the Commission’s complaint, TALX’s series of acquisitions from 2002 to 2005 substantially reduced competition in the nationwide provision of VOIE services and in the provision of outsourced UCM services, and enhanced TALX’s ability to unilaterally increase prices and decrease the quality of its services. Under the Commission consent order designed to restore competition, TALX agreed to allow certain customers terminate their agreements and give notice to the FTC before acquiring, or entering a management contract with, a UCM or VOIE service provider.

The Commission authorized both an administrative complaint and a motion for a preliminary injunction to challenge the proposed merger of Inova Health System Foundation’s and Prince William Health System (PWHS), alleging that the acquisition would violate federal antitrust laws by reducing competition for general acute care inpatient hospital services in Northern Virginia. On June 17, 2008 the Commission approved an order dismissing its administrative complaint, as the respondents publicly announced their mutual decision to terminate the proposed acquisition agreement.