Tag: Nonmerger

On 4/8/2013, Bosley, Inc., the nation’s largest manager of medical/surgical hair restoration procedures, settled Federal Trade Commission charges that it illegally exchanged competitively sensitive, nonpublic information about its business practices with one of its competitors, HC (USA), Inc., commonly known as Hair Club, in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act. In settling the FTC’s charges, Bosley has agreed not to communicate such information in the future, and will institute an antitrust compliance program. The FTC alleged that for at least the past four years, Bosley exchanged competitively sensitive, nonpublic information about its business operations with Hair Club. The information exchanged by the companies’ CEOs included details about future product offerings, surgical hair transplantation price floors and discounts, plans for business expansion and contraction, and current business operations and performance.

The FTC issued an administrative complaint on 7/17/2010 alleging that the state dental board in North Carolina is harming competition by blocking non-dentists from providing teeth-whitening services in the state. The FTC charged that the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners impermissibly ordered non-dentists to stop providing teeth-whitening services, which has made it harder to obtain these services and more expensive for North Carolina consumers. According to the FTC’s administrative complaint, teeth-whitening services are much less expensive when performed by non-dentist than when performed by dentists. In an Initial Decision issued July 14, 2011, the ALJ found that non-dentists compete with dentists to provide teeth whitening services in North Carolina and that the Dental Board's concerted action to exclude non-dentist-provided teeth whitening services from the market had a tendency to harm competition. The ALJ further found that the Dental Board's action had no valid pro competitive justification and constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade and an unfair method of competition. On February 8, 2011, the Commission denied the respondent's motion to dismiss, ruling that the Board's actions were not entitled to state action immunity. The Commission ruled that because the Board is controlled by practicing dentists, its condcut must be actively supervised by the state. OnDecember 7, 2011, the Commission issued an Opinion concluding that the Dental Board violated of Section 5 of the FTC Act, and agreed with the ALJ that the Dental Board's conduct "constituted concerte action, . . . had a tendency to harm competition and did in fact harm competition," and had no legitimate pro-competitive justification. The Commission concluded that the Dental Board's conduct could be deemed illegal under the "inherently suspect" mode of analysis because the challenged conduct had a clear tendency to suppress competition and lacked any countervailing procompetitive virtue. On May 3, 2013, the Fourth Circuit denied the Board's petition to review the Commission's decision and on 2/25/15, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

Eight independent nephrologists in Puerto Rico settled Federal Trade Commission charges that they illegally collectively bargained with insurers and refused to treat health plan patients when their price demands were rebuffed. Under a proposed order settling the FTC’s charges, the doctors are barred from jointly negotiating prices, jointly refusing to deal with any insurer, and jointly refusing to treat patients. According to the FTC’s complaint, the eight doctors have violated federal antitrust laws since late 2011 by 1) collectively negotiating and fixing the prices upon which they would contract with Humana to extract higher reimbursement rates, and 2) collectively terminating their contracts with Humana and refusing to treat Humana patients enrolled in the Mi Salud program when Humana would not meet their price demands.

The FTC approved an order settling charges that Robert Bosch GmbH’s acquisition of the SPX Service Solutions business of SPX Corporation would have given it a virtual monopoly in the market for air conditioning recycling, recovery, and recharge devices for vehicles. Under a settlement with the FTC, Bosch agreed to sell its automotive air conditioner repair equipment business, including RTI Technologies, Inc., to automotive equipment manufacturer, Mahle Clevite, Inc. Bosch also agreed to resolve allegations that, before its acquisition by Bosch, SPX harmed competition in the market for this equipment by reneging on a commitment to license key, standard-essential patents (SEPs) on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. The FTC alleged that SPX reneged on its obligation to license on FRAND terms by seeking injunctions against willing licensees of those patents. Bosch has agreed to abandon these claims for injunctive relief. 

The largest U.S. supplier of diagnostic testing products used by small animal veterinarians, IDEXX Laboratories, Inc., agreed to drop its exclusive-dealing arrangements with a top distributor, resolving FTC charges that it was using the exclusive arrangements to stifle competition. IDEXX has agreed to a settlement order that prohibits concurrent exclusive distribution arrangements with the three national distributors of point-of-care (POC) diagnostic testing products. According to the FTC’s complaint, IDEXX has used its dominant market power to reduce competition by threatening to drop the distributors if they carried other companies’ products that compete with IDEXX products.