Daniel Chapter One, and James Feijo individually and as an officer of Daniel Chapter One, In the Matter of
There is a related federal proceeding.
In some situations the FTC files a complaint under its administrative process instead of taking the case to a federal court. This is called an adjudicative proceeding. The party can decide to settle with us or they can contest the charges. If they contest the case it is heard before an administrative law judge in a trial-type proceeding. The Legal Library has information about cases brought by us before an administrative law judge.
There is a related federal proceeding.
The Commission issued an administrative complaint charging Realcomp with violating Section 5 of the FTC Act by prohibiting information on Exclusive Agency (EA) Listings and other forms of nontraditional listings from being transmitted from the multiple listing service (MLS) it maintains to public real estate web sites. The complaint further alleged that the conduct was collusive and exclusionary, because the brokers enacting the rules were essentially agreeing among themselves how to compete with one another, and were withholding the valuable benefits of the MLS from nontraditional real estate brokers. After the ALJ dismissed the complaint, Commission staff appealed the initial decision, and on November 2, 2009 the Commission issued an Opinion finding that Realcomp II had violated federal law by restricting the ability of member real estate agents to offer consumers lower-priced alternatives to traditional real estate services. Realcomp refused to transmit discount real estate listings to its own and other publicly available Web sites and excluded such listings from the default searches within its own database. The Commission found that these policies restricted access to these listings and harmed competition. The FTC’s Final Order requires Realcomp to provide its members non-discriminatory access to non-traditional and lower-price listings on its Multiple Listing Service (MLS) and to stop preventing such listings from being sent to its public real estate sites. Following an appeal by RealComp, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the FTC order. On August 15, 2011 Realcomp appealed to the Supreme Court. On October 11, 2011 the Supreme Court denied Realcomp's petition for a writ of certiorari.
Under terms of the order, Aspen agreed to divest Hypotech’s continuous process and batch process assets and Aspen’s operator training software and service business to a Commission-approved buyer to settle charges in the complaint and resolve the administrative proceedings. The Commission issued an administrative complaint on August 6, 2003 that challenged Aspen’s 2002 acquisition of Hyprotech, Ltd. alleging that the acquisition eliminated a significant competitor in the provision of process engineering simulation software for industry. According to the complaint, the acquisition has led to reduced innovation competition in six specific process engineering simulation software markets.
The Commission authorized a preliminary injunction to block Thoratec Corporation’s proposed $282 million acquisition of rival medical device maker HeartWare International, Inc., charging that the transaction would substantially reduce competition in the U.S. market for left ventricular devices (LVADs), a life-sustaining treatment for patients with advanced heart failure. The FTC’s administrative complaint alleges that Thoratec seeks to maintain its monopoly by acquiring HeartWare, thus eliminating the only significant threat to Thoratec’s continued dominance of the LVAD market. In August of 2009, the parties announced they would not to proceed with the proposed acquisition, and the Commission dismissed the Administrative Complaint without filing an motion for preliminary injunction in federal court.
The FTC authorized a lawsuit to block CSL Limited’s proposed $3.1 billion acquisition of Talecris Biotherapeutics Holdings Corporation, charging that the deal would would substantially reduce competition in the U.S. markets for four plasma-derivative protein therapies – Immune globulin (Ig), Albumin, Rho-D, and Alpha-1. These therapies are used to treat patients suffering from illnesses such as primary immunodeficiency diseases, chronic inflammatory demyelinating polyneuropathy, alpha-1 antitrypsin disease, and hemolytic disease of the newborn. In approving the administrative complaint seeking to block the deal, the Commission also authorized the staff to seek a preliminary injunction in federal district court in Washington, D.C., to stop the transaction pending completion of the administrative trial. Following the FTC's lawsuit to block the transaction, CSL Limited announced that it would not proceed with its proposed acquisition.
The Commission filed an administrative complaint charging that between 1991 and 1996 Rambus, Inc. joined and participated in the JEDEC Solid State Technology Association (JEDEC), the leading standard-setting industry for computer memory. According to the complaint, while a member of JEDEC, Rambus observed standard-setting work involving technologies which Rambus believed were or could be covered by its patent applications, but failed to disclose this to JEDEC. In 1999 and 2000, after JEDEC had adopted industry-wide standards incorporating the technologies at issue and the industry had become locked in to the use of those technologies, Rambus sought to enforce its patents against companies producing JEDEC-compliant memory, and collected substantial royalties from several producers of DRAM (dynamic random access memory).
The administrative law judge dismissed all charges against Rambus, finding that Rambus’ conduct before the JEDEC standard-setting organization did not amount to deception and did not violate any extrinsic duties, such as a duty of good faith to disclose patents or patent applications. Upon review, the FTC issued an opinion concluding that Rambus unlawfully monopolized markets for four computer memory technologies that have been incorporated into industry standards DRAM chips. The Commission found that, through a course of deceptive conduct, Rambus was able to distort a critical standard-setting process and engage in an anticompetitive “hold up” of the computer memory industry. In a separate opinion on the appropriate remedy, the Commission barred Rambus from making misrepresentations or omissions to standard-setting organizations, and required Rambus to license its SDRAM and DDR SDRAM technology and setting limits to the royalty rates it can collect under the licensing agreements.Tp>
Rambus appealed the Commission’s order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and in April 2008, the appellate court set aside the Commissions final orders. The Supreme Court denied the Commission's Petition for Writ of Certiorari, and on May 14, 2009 the Commission formally dismissed the complaint.
In November 2008, the Commission issued an administrative complaint charging that the acquisition of CCC Information Services by Mitchell International, a transaction valued at $1.4 billion, would be anticompetitive in the market for “estimatics”, a database system used by auto insurers and repair shops to generate repair estimates for consumers. According to the complaint, the transaction would also harm competition in the market for total loss valuation (TLV) systems, used to inform consumers when their vehicle has been totaled. The transaction would create a new entity with well over half of the market share for these systems, allowing for unilateral price increases, and facilitating coordination among the remaining smaller competitors in the market. The Commission concurrently authorized staff to file a complaint in Federal District Court. On March 9, 2009, the US District Court for the District of Columbia ordered a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order preventing the parties from consummating the transaction pending a full administrative trial on the merits. On March 13, 2009, since the respondents announced that they decided not to proceed with the proposed merger the Commission dismissed the Administrative Complaint.
The Commission issued an administrative complaint to challenge Oldcastle Architectural’s (a subsidiary of CRH) proposed $540 million acquisition of Pavestone Companies as anticompetitive in the US market for drycast concrete hardscape products sold to retailers such as The Home Depot, Lowe’s, and Wal-Mart Stores. According to the complaint, the acquisition would reduce competition by combining the only two companies capable of the national manufacture and sale of these heavy products, which include concrete pavers, segmented retaining wall blocks, and concrete patio products, due to the difficulty in distribution of such products, and the fact that both Oldcastle and Pavestone already possess large distribution networks. The acquisition as proposed would result in Oldcastle gaining a 90% market share for the manufacture and sale of these drycast products to home centers in the United States. The Commission also authorized staff to file a complaint in federal court seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to prevent consummation of the proposed transaction, but the respondents decided not to proceed with the proposed merger and the Commission dismissed the administrative complaint.
The Commission issued an administrative complaint to block CCS Corporation’s proposed $85 million acquisition of Newpark Environmental Services. According to the complaint, the proposed transaction was anticompetitive because it would consolidate two of the leading providers of waste disposal services for the offshore oil and natural gas exploration and production industry in the Gulf Coast Region, leading to higher prices and decreased service levels. In response to the complaint, CCS, a subsidiary of Red Sky, threatened to close down its operations in the Gulf Coast should the acquisition not receive the necessary regulatory approvals. The Commission filed for a preliminary injunction, and temporary restraining order in federal court. As a result, the parties abandoned the transaction, and the Commission dismissed its administrative complaint.
In an administrative complaint issued on October 25, 2001, the Commission challenged the February 2001 purchase of the Water Division and Engineered Construction Division of Pitt-Des Moines, Inc. alleging that the consummated merger significantly reduced competition in four separate markets involving the design and construction of various types of field-erected specialty industrial storage tanks in the United States. On June 27, 2003, an administrative law judge upheld the complaint and ordered the divestiture all of the assets acquired in the acquisition. In December 2004, the Commission approved an interim consent order prohibiting Chicago Bridge & Iron from altering the assets acquired from Pitt-Des Moines, Inc. except “in the ordinary course of business.” These assets included but were not limited to real property; personal property; equipment; inventories; and intellectual property. On January 7, 2005 the Commission upheld in part the ruling of an administrative law judge that Chicago Bridge & Iron’s acquisition of the Water Division and the Engineered Construction Division of Pitt-Des Moines, Inc. created a near-monopoly in four separate markets involving the design and construction of various types of field-erected specialty industrial storage tanks in the United States. In an effort to restore competition as it existed prior to the merger, the Commission ordered Chicago Bridge to reorganize the relevant product business into two separate, stand-alone, viable entities capable of competing in the markets described in the complaint and to divest one of those entities within six months. On January 25, 2008 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the Commission's order. In November 2008, the Commission approved divestiture of the assets to Matrix Service Company.
An administrative law judge upheld the administrative complaint that charged that the North Texas Specialty Physicians (NTSP), a physician group practicing in Forth Worth, Texas, collectively determined acceptable fees for physician services in negotiating contracts with health insurance plans and other third party payers; thus engaging in horizontal price fixing. On December 1, 2005, the Commission issued a unanimous decision upholding the allegations that NTSP negotiated agreements among participating physicians on price and other terms, refused to negotiate with payers except on terms agreed to among its members, and refused to submit payors offers to members if the terms did not satisfy the group’s demands. The Commission concluded that the group’s contracting activities with payors amounts to unlawful horizontal price fixing and that respondent’s efficiency claims were not legitimate and not supported by the evidence.
The respondent appealed the Commission decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Court agreed with the Commission that the anticompetitive effects of NTSP’s practices were obvious. Per remand by the Court, the Commission modified one provision of its remedial order, issuing a Final Order in September 2008. On February 28, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court denied NTSP's petition for review.
On February 10, 2004 the Commission issued an administrative complaint alleging that following Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation's acquisition of Highland Park Hospital prices charged to health insurers for medical services increased and, therefore, higher costs for health insurance were passed on to consumers of hospital services in the Cook and Lake counties of Illinois. The complaint also alleged that a physicians group affiliated with both hospitals, Highland Park Independent Physician Group, negotiated prices for physicians on staff at Evanston as well as for several hundred independent physicians not affiliated with either hospital. According to the complaint, these actions constitute illegal price fixing among competing physicians or physician groups and deny consumers the benefits of competition in physician services. In an initial Decision, the Administrative law judge found that the acquisition resulted in higher prices and substantially lessened competition for acute care inpatient services in parts of Chicago’s northwestern suburbs. The ALJ entered an order that would require the divestiture of the acquired hospital. On appeal, the Commission ruled that the acquisition was anticompetitive, but concluded that in this “highly unusual case,” divestiture, the remedy imposed by the administrative law judge, would be too costly and potentially risky and instead imposed a conduct remedy. The Commission’s order requires Evanston to set up two separate and independent contract negotiation teams to bargain with managed care organizations to revive competition between Evanston’s two hospitals and the Highland Park hospital.